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This paper studies financial market linkages in Europe throughout the lifetime of the Euro. In 
considering the national equity and sovereign debt markets of the seven biggest economies in 
Europe, I find important developments in cross-country as well as cross-asset linkages. There 
is evidence for a revival of country-specific risk, causing a differentiation between riskier 
“peripheral” Euro area countries (Italy, Spain) and presumably safer “core” countries 
(Germany, the Netherlands). As a consequence, a “flight to safety” phenomenon can be 
observed. Interestingly, there is evidence that these “flight to safety” capital flows partially 
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The financial turmoil throughout the last decade has sparked a discussion about the potential 
impact financial market integration has on the stability of the global financial system. The 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the subsequent outbreak of the global financial 
crisis has illustrated how increasingly integrated and thus complex global financial markets 
have become. While the global economy has partially recovered since the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in the U.S., the European Union has been identified more recently as one of 
the biggest threats to the stability of the global financial system. Being an economic and 
monetary union with the highest degree of integration among individual countries in the 
world, Europe serves as an example of what challenges might come from further global 
financial integration. 
Recently, the discussion about financial stability gained further controversy through 
the market interventions of Central Banks around the world. The decision by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) to drastically cut the key policy rate as of 2008 and to subsequently 
launch asset purchase programs caused major distortions in European financial markets. The 
interest rate on the main refinancing operations (MRO), which is the main determinant of the 
liquidity provided to the European financial system, dropped from 3.75% in 2008 to 0.00% in 
2016. The cut of interest rates in combination with ECB’s asset purchases lead to a potential 
decoupling of economic fundamentals and sovereign yields. While the average debt-to-GDP 
ratio increased from 68.5% in 2008 to 90.4% in 2015 (Eurostat, 2016), the Euro area 
benchmark bond, representing the average yields on 10-year government bonds, has 
decreased from 4.80% to 1.19% over the same period (ECB, 2016). The perception of the 
trade-off between the effectiveness of this unconventional policy in stabilising price levels 
and the potential dangers it posts to the financial system in terms of decoupling asset prices 
from their fundamentals strongly diverge.  
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The developments after the introduction of the Euro illustrate that essential factors 
affecting financial markets and accordingly also their interdependences in the Euro area have 
changed. Therefore, it is of interest to analyse potential structural changes in linkages between 
European financial markets. Despite its pioneering role in extreme market integration there 
has not been any comprehensive study describing the development of financial market 
interdependencies in Europe throughout the lifetime of the Euro, including the major Euro 
area economies and asset classes. The underlying paper aims to fill this gap in the academic 
literature and thus tries to enhance the understanding of extreme financial market integration. 
The two financial markets considered in this paper are the equity market and the sovereign 
debt market in the seven biggest economies in the Euro area. Both linkages within asset 
classes as well as across asset classes are considered.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the most relevant literature on financial market linkages and of the effect of ECB’s 
unconventional policy on asset prices. Section 3 states the research hypothesis and lays out 
the authors expectations. Section 4 introduces the data sample, while section 5 describes the 
methodology and estimation strategy. Section 6 and 7 present the main results. In section 8 a 
brief overview of the empirical limitations as well as of possible further extensions of the 
underlying paper is given. Finally, section 9 concludes.  
2! Literature Review 
The topic of financial market linkages is very broad, including many different possible 
applications. The academic papers differ in their empirical model, the asset classes examined 
and in their geographic focus. To limit the scope of the underlying review the paper focuses 
on literature dealing with cross-country linkages within equity and sovereign debt markets as 
well as with linkages between the two asset classes. In the second part of the review a brief 
overview of the literature dealing with ECB’s unconventional policy is provided. 
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As one of the first scholars, Eun and Shim (1989) conduct an in-depth analysis of the 
interdependence structure of national stock markets. Focusing on global equity markets, they 
use a vector autoregressive (VAR) model and detect substantial interactions among markets. 
More specifically, they find that innovations in the U.S. stock market rapidly transmit to other 
global stock markets, whereas no other foreign market can significantly explain movements in 
U.S. stocks. More than fifteen years later, Baele (2005) uses a regime switching framework to 
model volatility spillover in order to investigate the extent to which regional integration and 
globalization has led to increasing interdependencies among equity markets. He finds that in 
both Europe and the U.S. spillover intensity substantially increased in the 1980s and 1990s. 
This development is especially pronounced for Europe. Focusing on structural changes in 
European markets, he shows that economic integration in the second half of the 1980s 
increased spillovers more strongly than the introduction of the monetary union in the 1990s. 
The fact that the liberalization of European capital markets was more important in bringing 
national stock markets closer together relative to the introduction of the Euro is further 
supported by Sigel, Lundblad, Harvey and Bekaert (2011). According to their paper, 
becoming a member of the European Union significantly reduces equity market segmentation 
between member countries, whereas the subsequent adoption of the Euro has minimal effects 
on further integration.  
Evidence for integration among European equity markets is also found in the literature 
examining the determinants of equity returns. Hardouvelis, Malliaropulos and Priestley 
(2006) observe that expected returns of national stock markets become increasingly 
determined by EU-wide market risk and less by country-specific risk factors. This finding is 
in line with the research done by Adjaoute and Danthine (2004). Also focusing on the 
determinants of equity returns, they show an increasing importance of sector-specific rather 
than country-specific factors. Consequently, they infer that while investing in European 
equities, country diversification is becoming less important relative to sector diversification.  
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In a series of papers Diebold and Yilmaz (2009; 2011; 2012) develop a framework 
based on a VAR model to analyse spillovers in different asset classes. Their research 
describes the increased importance of European financial markets for global financial 
stability.  Twenty years after Eun and Shim (1989) had ascertained the global dominance of 
the U.S. stock market, Diebold and Yilmaz show that European equity markets have become 
key contributors in transmitting shocks to global financial markets. 
 
Compared to the literature on equity market linkages, the research dealing with 
interdependencies among sovereign debt markets is more recent, demonstrating the growing 
importance of these markets. Especially in Europe public debt markets became more 
important due to the sovereign debt crisis and the subsequent asset purchases by the ECB. 
Lappodis (2004) follows a similar approach to Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) in order to 
describe long-term sovereign yields. More specifically, he calculates a spillover index among 
major global countries. He observes that on a global scale sovereign debt markets have 
become more integrated throughout the 1990s. The greatest convergence is found among the 
European Union with Germany retaining a hegemonic status. These findings are supported by 
Christiansen (2007), who extents the sample to include the introduction of the Euro. She 
observes that bond markets in major Euro area countries have become more integrated, 
especially after the introduction of the Euro. According to her, the main driver for this 
integration process appears to be the convergence of interest rates between European 
countries. In contrast to previous papers analysing sovereign debt markets, Longstaff, Pan, 
Pedersen and Singleton (2011) take advantage of the increasing role of credit default swaps 
(CDS). In their paper they focus on sovereign CDS of twenty-five countries in order to 
analyse sovereign credit risk determinants. They show that across countries sovereign credit 
risk tends to be much more correlated than equity index returns between the same countries. 
According to them, this is because sovereign credit risk is largely driven by general risk 
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premiums, liquidity patterns and other global financial market variables and to a lesser extent 
by country-specific macroeconomic fundaments.  
A new set of papers published after the collapse of Lehman Brothers start to focus on 
possible changes in interdependence structures caused by the global financial crisis. Claeys 
and Vašíček (2012) are among the first to conduct a more in-depth analysis of linkages among 
European sovereign bond markets. They observe that spillovers among sovereign yields have 
significantly increased since 2007, while there is still heterogeneity across countries. 
Furthermore, and in line with previous findings, their finding indicates that spillovers are 
more important than domestic factors in determining yields in the Euro area. Caceres, Guzzo 
and Segoviano (2010) use a methodology developed by Segoviano (2006) to estimate 
spillover coefficients between countries in the Euro area. They show that the surge in global 
risk aversion has significantly influenced sovereign spreads. After 2008 investors started 
focusing more strongly on country-specific risk factors, partially revoking the previously 
observed convergence of interest rates. Moreover, the authors estimate spillover coefficients 
for each country in the Euro area and find that the gravity centre of spillovers shifted from 
countries that were initially more affected by the financial crisis, namely Ireland, Austria and 
the Netherlands, to countries with weaker long-term fundamentals, like Spain, Portugal and 
Greece. 
 
So far, not much academic efforts have been concentrated on studying the linkages between 
different asset classes. As one of the first scholars Hartman, Straetmans and De Vries (2004) 
study extreme co-movements within and between stock and bond markets. In considering the 
G-5 countries1, they attempt to answer the question of whether different markets crash jointly. 
They show that simultaneous crashes in stock markets are about twice as likely as in bond 
markets, while stock-bond co-crashes are as frequent as the flight to safety from stocks to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The G-5 comprises France, Germany, Japan, UK and USA 
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bonds. Furthermore, they find evidence that extreme cross-country linkages are as strong as 
linkages within countries, illustrating a potential drawback of international financial market 
integration.  
Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon (2005) examine financial transmission channels 
between asset classes in both the U.S and the Euro area using a VAR model. Contrary to 
Hartman et al. (2004) they find evidence that asset prices react strongest to other domestic 
asset price shocks. Although weaker, international spillovers both within and across asset 
classes are also significant. In a more detailed analysis Garcia and Tsafack (2011) investigate 
interdependences between pairs of countries, namely U.S./Canada and Germany/France. In 
line with Ehrmann et al. (2005), they find that cross-country interdependences within the 
same asset classes are stronger than linkages between stocks and bonds in the same country. 
Also using a VAR framework, Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) analyse possible structural 
changes in volatility spillovers across U.S stock, bond, foreign exchange and commodities 
markets. In their study they show that cross-market volatility spillovers were rather limited 
until Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2007. As the financial crisis intensified so did volatility 
spillovers, especially those originating from the equity market. Looking at stock markets, 
sovereign CDS spread and exchange rates Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012) examine the 
sensitivity of financials and non-financials in the Euro Area to the crisis development in the 
US and to sovereign debt problems in Europe. They confirm the finding of structural changes 
around 2007 and 2011.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the unconventional policy implemented by the ECB as a 
reaction to the global financial crisis and the subsequent European debt crisis has led to 
market distortions, with the potential of changing interdependencies between European 
financial markets. Recently, various papers have been published studying the impact of low 
interest rates and asset purchases on equity and bond prices. Gabacorta (2009) investigates the 
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linkages between low interest rates and bank risk-taking. He observes that periods of low 
interest rates over an extended time cause an increase in the willingness of banks to take risks. 
According to him this is due to two reasons: through a search for yields triggered by 
decreasing returns on bonds; and by the impact interest rates have in the valuation process of 
cash flows, which in turn modifies how banks measure risk.  
As the ECB has launched a series of different asset purchase programs since 2010, the 
most recent literature dealing with monetary transmission channels focuses on the impact of 
these programs on asset prices. Fratzscher, Duca and Straub (2014) show that ECB’s bond 
purchases under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), which was the first asset purchase 
program, were efficient in decreasing bond spreads between “peripheral” and “core” Euro 
area countries. While lowering market fragmentation in European bond markets it also lifted 
equity prices in Europe. These findings are in line with Szczerbowicz (2015) who shows that 
ECB’s asset purchases fed through into other asset classes. Her results indicate that the 
covered bond purchases diminished sovereign spreads, while sovereign bond purchases 
reduced covered bond spreads. Independently, Pattipeilohy, Van den Endm Tabbae, Frost and 
De Haan (2013), Eser and Schwaab (2013), and Ghysels, Idier, Manganelli and Vergota 
(2014) find similar results. 
3! Research Hypothesis 
As outline by the previous section, the literature dealing with linkages between financial 
markets has been more of a patchwork, each scholar focusing on different asset classes, 
events and countries. Whereas earlier papers have focused on structural linkages between 
different financial markets, more recent papers shifted their focus towards extreme spillover 
effects or contagion. While the tenor of the academic work finds that financial markets tend to 
become more integrated both around the world and in Europe, there is some evidence 
showing that this integration is slowing down. 
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The versatile developments since the introduction of the Euro illustrate that essential 
factors affecting financial markets and accordingly also their interdependences in the Euro 
area have considerably changed. The underlying research question is, how linkages between 
national European equity and sovereign debt markets have changed throughout the lifetime of 
the Euro. The first question the paper tries to investigate is whether structural linkages 
between the two asset classes exist on a national level, and, more importantly, whether these 
interdependences have changed over time. As already mentioned there is evidence that the set 
of factors separately influencing equity and sovereign debt markets have altered, thus raising 
suspicion that possible linkages between these two asset classes have also changed through 
time. Two reasons for structural changes in the linkages between national equity and 
sovereign bond markets can be expected: First, after the outbreak of the European sovereign 
debt crisis investors started to focus more strongly on country-specific risk. This lead to 
increasing sovereign spreads primarily in “peripheral” Euro area countries, while only 
marginally affecting those in “core” countries. Consequently, the country-specific risk and 
return profile of sovereign debt relative to domestic equity has altered. Second, ECB’s asset 
purchases have been aimed at covered and sovereign bonds, thus directly affecting their 
prices. As mentioned in the literature review these measures have also inflated equity prices, 
but only indirectly through different transmission channels. Accordingly, it can be expected 
that domestic interdependencies between sovereign bonds and stocks have changed. 
The second question the paper tries to answer is whether the extent of cross-border 
linkages within the considered asset classes, as well as between the two different asset classes 
have changed throughout the life time of the Euro. Did financial market integration in Europe 
continue after the introduction of the Euro? Or has the financial turmoil throughout the last 
decade led to a segregation between different national financial markets. In general, the 
second question investigates the extent to which movements in equity or debt markets in one 
of the considered countries can partially be explained by debt and equity markets of the other 
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seven European countries. Again, it is of special interest whether this interdependencies 
changed throughout time.  
4! Data 
In order to answer the research question the paper analyses the linkages among equity and 
sovereign debt market in each of the seven biggest economies in the Euro area, namely 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium and Austria. Therefore, two different 
asset classes are considered: equity, proxied by the respective national equity index; and 
sovereign debt, proxied by the respective 10-year government bond. For the purpose of 
estimation, the equity indices are taken in logarithms. For the government bonds this is not 
necessary, since the yield is already expressed in percentage. The underlying data covers the 
entire lifetime of the Euro and thus starts on the 1st of January 2002 and ends on the 13th of 
June 2016, representing 3637 trading days. Due to the large number of countries and the 
relative long sampling period the data is retrieved from two different sources to ensure that 
the time series in in each asset class are consistent with each other. The national MSCI equity 
indices are retrieved from Datastream, while the yields on 10-year government bonds are 
retrieved from Bloomberg as the generic government bond yields. 
Figure I and II display the performance of the national equity and sovereign debt 
markets, respectively. As can be seen in Figure I, despite their different starting levels in 2002 
the national stock markets display similar patterns: a period of rising equity prices between 
2003 and 2007, a collapse of stock markets around the bankruptcy of Lehman Brother in 
2008, and a subsequent recovery of the markets until 2015. Furthermore, it seems that equity 
markets have been less volatile until the outbreak of the financial crisis. In general, Figure I 
already indicates the possible existence structural breaks in national stock markets.  
Looking at Figure II, one can see that the developments of European government 
yields exhibit very different patterns relative to those observed in equity markets. Until 2008 
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the performance observed across countries is very similar, but subsequently diverges. While 
most sovereign yields continue to fall, the yield spreads in Italy, Spain and partially in 
Belgium increase between 2009 and 2013. This development indicates that investors seem to 
start to differentiate between European sovereign debt markets. As of 2013 European 
government yields tend to converge again among European countries. When comparing the 
equity and sovereign debt market it can be seen that the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the 
subsequent outbreak of the financial crisis mainly caused equity markets to crash and only 
subsequently spilled over to European sovereign debt markets.  
 
Figure I: Performance of the National MSCI Equity Indices 
 
 




To analyse the linkages between the relevant financial markets a vector autoregression (VAR) 
framework is used. First advocated by Sims (1980) a VAR models interdependencies between 
economic time series and thus describes the dynamic structure of the included variables. 
These models are multivariate extensions of standard autoregressive models, meaning that 
every independent variable in the system of equations itself is modelled as a depended 
variable. By doing so the model accounts for all possible interdependences between the 
considered financial markets and thereby disentangles their individual effects. 
5.1! Domestic Cross-Asset Linkages 
To analyse linkages between asset classes on a national level, I follow a similar approach to 
Arezki and Sy (2011). For each of the seven countries a separate VAR model of the following 
form is estimated:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!"# = % + β("#)( + ⋯+ β+"#)+ + ,#        (1) 
where Y. is a 2×1 vector storing the two different financial markets, c and β2!(i = 1.… . p) 
are, respectively,!2×1 and 2×2 coefficient matrices and p represents the optimal lag-length. 
The error process ε. = ε(... … . ε:..  is a 2×1 zero mean white noise process with covariance 
matrix E ε.ε.< = Σ> that is ε.~(0, Σ>). In order to investigate whether there are structural 
changes in the possible linkages between the two financial market, the data is tested for 
structural breaks. If there are statistically significant breakpoints between 2002 and 2016, one 
can split the data according to these breakpoints into subsamples. Then, for each of these 
subsamples an individual VAR is estimated following model (1). 
5.2! Cross-Border Linkages 
To answer the second question of whether there are cross-border linkages within asset classes 
the general model (1) is also used. However, for each financial market one VAR is estimated 
including all countries. Therefore, in model (1) Y. is a 7×1 vector storing the seven national 
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markets of one asset class, c and β2!(i = 1.… . p) are, respectively,!7×1 and 7×7 coefficient 
matrices. After setting up the VAR model the procedure is similar to the one used for the 
domestic cross-asset linkages. If structural breaks are detected, for each of the subsample an 
individual VAR is estimated. 
5.3! Extreme Co-Movements 
As explained in the literature review recent studies tend to have shifted their focus from 
investigating structural linkages among financial markets towards analysing extreme co-
movements between markets. The question is: How do the two considered asset classes react 
to a negative unexpected movement within the same asset class in one of the other seven 
countries? For example: How does Spanish sovereign debt perform when Austrian sovereign 
debt market experiences a shock? However, not only extreme co-movements within asset 
classes are studied, but also between different asset classes. For instance: Does a shock in the 
10-year German government bond, which often acts as an important benchmark for various 
assets in Europe, result in unexpected movements in equity markets of other Euro countries? 
If there are simultaneous shocks in two distinct markets there are two explanations: First, the 
shock occurs in one market and subsequently spills over to the other market. These successive 
shocks are referred to as contagion. Contagion effects have been observed more frequently in 
the recent past and thus have become a central aspect of the discussion about financial 
stability. The domino effect triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008 or the credit rating downgrade of French government debt in September 2015 act as an 
example. Both these developments simultaneously put pressure on national European equity 
markets. Second, there could be an unexpected negative movement that influences different 
markets independently. In this case the shock occurs jointly in two markets triggered by a 
common exogenous factor. An example would be the ECB’s announcement in January 2015 
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to extend the asset purchase program to include Euro area government bonds. This decision 
immediately decreased European sovereign yields.  
The identification of extreme movements in both the equity and debt market is based 
on the residuals of model (1). As residuals measure the difference between the observed value 
and the model’s prediction, highly negative or highly positive residuals imply unexpected 
movements in the underlying variable. In model (1) this implies that on these trading days the 
variable cannot be explained by its own lag or by the lag of the other domestic asset class. For 
each financial market a dummy series is created, based on the most extreme residuals. To 
determine which residual can be considered as extreme the paper initially considers a 2%, 5% 
and 10% cut-off criterion. Based on the frequency and distribution of the identified shocks 
under the three different cut-off criterions, the paper opts for the 5% cut-off criterion. Since 
the paper analyses negative events, 5% of the most negative residuals in the equity market are 
identified as shocks. Based on these identified shocks a dummy variable for each market is 
created. Each time a shock is identified the dummy variable is equal to 1, otherwise it is 0. 
For the sovereign bond market, the dummy construction works exactly the opposite way. 
Since the yield is inversely related to the price of the underlying bond, an increase in the yield 
corresponds with a decrease in the bond price. Therefore, 5% of the most positive residuals 
are in this case identified as shocks. As can be seen in Figure I and II provided in the 
Appendix, the identified shocks in both the equity and sovereign debt market are well 
distributed throughout the whole sample. The dummy identification based on 2% of most 
extreme residuals leads to a clustering of shocks, while the 10% cut-off criterion identifies too 
many shocks. 
Important to note is that the shock dummies are estimated for each asset class and for 
each subsample separately. Since the identification of the equity (sovereign debt) shocks is 
based on 5% of the most extreme negative (positive) residuals in each of the twenty-four 
VAR models, the same number of shocks is identified across countries (see Table 1).  
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Shocks in Equity 
regression 
Shock in Sovereign 
Debt regression 
2002-2007 1508 75 75 
2008-2011 1009 50 50 
2012-2016 1118 56 56 
 
According to theory, a single event on a financial market is processed as follows: 
"# = CDED + ,#  (3) 
If the coefficient (CD) associated with the dummy ED is significant it indicates co-movement in 
the markets. Because of the large number of individual dummies, a single dummy EF is 
created for each asset class. The dummy variable ED is equal to 1 each time a shock is 
identified in the respective market, and 0 otherwise. Consequently, for each country there are 
two dummies: an equity shock dummy and sovereign debt shock dummy. The dummy 
variable is included in model (1) and the VAR takes the following form: 
"# = % + β("#)( + ⋯+ β+"#)+ + CDED + ,#   (4) 
where "# is again a vector storing the two financial markets. Using this specification will lead 
to unbiased estimations of the average effects of cross-border shocks. Additionally, the model 
disentangles the effects of the structural linkages between the national equity and sovereign 
debt markets and the impact of cross-border shocks.  
6! Preliminary Diagnostics  
6.1! Structural Break Test  
To test for structural breaks, a supremum Wald test is chosen. This test is performed without 
imposing a known break date. The supremum test statistic is equal to the maximum value of 
the test statistic that is obtained from a series of Wald tests over a range of possible break 
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dates in the sample. The idea behind these tests is to compare the maximum sample test with 
what could be expected under the null hypothesis of no break (Quandt, 1960; Hansen, 1997). 
Consequently, it tests whether the model’s performance can be improved by introducing a 
structural break. For a more detailed analysis, the break test is performed on the individual 
regressions of the VAR and not on the entire VAR model. This implies that for each asset 
class a separate breakpoint, if existent, is estimated. 
As can be seen in Table 2, the Wald test indicates that in each regression there is at 
least one statistically significant break point. Overall, there is evidence for two general 
structural breaks in the data sample: one around 2008 and the other one around 2011. The 
estimated breaks in the national equity markets are extremely consistent across countries. The 
test implies structural changes in the 3rd quarter of 2008 for all countries. The structural 
changes in the sovereign debt market are not as clear those in the equity markets but still 
identify one common break point. With the exception of sovereign debt in Italy and Spain, the 
10-year government yields seem to exhibit a structural break around the end of 2011. 
However, the Wald test only indicates the most significant structural break in the tested 
regression, implying that there may be additional, but less significant break points. This 
means that the seven equity markets may also experience a break in 2011 and the sovereign 
debt markets one in 2008. The indicated breaks in the two asset classes may not surprise. 
While the collapse of Lehman Brother in 2008 mainly caused equity markets to crash, the 
outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011/2012 affected sovereign debt markets.   
Apart from generally similar estimated break points across countries, the slightly 
different break points in sovereign debt markets might indicate some grouping of countries. 
On the one hand, there are the “Core” countries, namely Germany, France, Netherlands, 
Belgium and Austria, who are exhibit almost the same break points in 2011. On the other 
hand, there are the “peripheral” countries, namely Spain and Italy, exhibiting their most 




Table 2: Estimated Break Points in Regressions 












Germany 1680 Q3-2008  2337 Q2-2011 
France 1680 Q3-2008  2561 Q1-2012 
Italy 1680 Q3-2008  3020 Q1-2014 
Spain 1661 Q3-2008  3028 Q1-2014 
Netherlands 1680 Q3-2008  2337 Q2-2011 
Belgium 1619 Q2-2008  2496 Q4-2011 
Austria 1679 Q3-2008  2496 Q4-2011 
 
 
As a result of the structural break test, the underlying sample is split into three separate 
subsamples. The first subsample spans the period from 2002 until the end of 2007 and 
represents the introduction of the Euro. The second subsample covers the years 2008 to 2011 
and includes the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent outbreak of the global 
financial crisis. Finally, the last subsample starts in 2012 and ends in June 2016. This period 
is mainly characterised by the deepening of the European sovereign debt crisis and ECB’s 
ultra-loose monetary policy. For each of these subsamples a separate VAR model is run, thus 
there are three models for each of the seven countries, leading to a total of twenty-one VAR 
models.  
6.2! Vector Autoregression Model 
Given that the data comprises of raw price series from financial markets, one has to check for 
the existence of unit roots. As suspected, the Augmented Dicky Fuller test reveals that one 
cannot reject the existence of a unit root even at 10% significance. Consequently, the data 
displays a stochastic trend and is thus non-stationary. Even though the variables are non-
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stationary they are kept in levels, allowing for the possibility of long-run cointegration.2 
Turning to the specification of the VAR models, the paper starts with model (1) and 
subsequently specifies model (2). To check for cointegration relations, firstly the seven VAR 
models (1) covering the entire sample from 2002 until 2016 are analysed. The Johansson test 
leads to accept that in Germany, France, Spain and the Netherlands there exists at least one 
cointegration relationship. Consequently, in these four countries there is evidence for long-run 
relationships between the two asset classes. The fact that only some countries exhibit 
cointegration relationships is a further sign of heterogeneity among the seven countries. 
Furthermore, it confirms the suspicion of possible country grouping according to structural 
similarities. As mentioned in section 4.1. Germany, France and the Netherland seem to enjoy 
some similar characteristics.   
After completing the preliminary diagnostics for the full sample model (1), the 
appropriate lag length has to be determined for each twenty-four VAR models. While the 
Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) exclusively suggest one lag for the first 
subsample (2002-2007), it advocates for two lags in several countries in the second (2008-
2011) and third subsample (2012-2016). In the second subsample Italy, Spain, Belgium and 
Austria and in the third subsample Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Belgium call for two lags 
(see Table 3). For easier comparison between the models the lag length in all models for the 
second and third subsample will be fixed to two, even though this will not always lead to the 
most parsimonious model. The VAR models for the first subsample are estimated using one 
lag.  
Turning to the cross-country VAR model (2), the same steps have to be completed to 
ensure the right specification of each model. As we have two asset classes and three 
subsample, there are a total of six VAR models. Contrary to model (1) for all these VAR 
models the SBIC information criterion suggests one lag. It seems that cross-border linkages 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Engle and Granger (1987) prove that considering a VAR model in difference while there exists at least one 
cointegration relationship would lead to bias estimators. 
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within the asset class lose their significance faster than domestic cross-asset linkages. 
Furthermore, the Johansson test shows that each of the VAR models (2) exhibits various 
cross-border cointegration relationships. 
Table 3: Lag Length suggested by  SBIC Information Criterion 
 Domestic Cross-Asset VAR  
Model (1) 
 Cross-Country 
VAR Model (2) 
 





1st Subsample 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 
2nd Subsample 1 1 2 2 1 2 2  1 1 
3rd Subsample 1 1 2 2 2 2 1  1 1 
 
7! Empirical Results 
7.1! Domestic Cross-Asset Linkages 
To analyse the linkages among equity as well as among sovereign debt markets on a national 
level, for each country separate VAR models are estimated. Specifically, for each country 
there are three different VAR models, one for each of the previously identified subsamples. 
The estimated coefficients and their significance are displayed in Table 4, 5 and 6 for the first, 
second and third subsample respectively. As can be seen in Table 4 representing the pre-crisis 
subsample spanning the period 2002 until 2007, there is a high degree of homogeneity among 
the countries. All seven countries exhibit similar linkages between their national equity and 
debt market. This confirms the academic literature stating that a high degree of integration 
among European financial markets has already been reached prior to the introduction of the 
Euro. Not only the same coefficients are significant but also the magnitude of these are very 
similar. In both markets the autoregressive coefficient is significant and close to unity, thus 
confirming the presence of a unit root. Furthermore, the sovereign debt market negatively 
influences the equity market. As sovereign debt is measured by its yield, the negative 
coefficient implies that an increasing yield, which represents decreasing bond prices, feeds 
through to the domestic equity market. However, this transmission channel only applies to 
! 19!
innovations originating from the sovereign debt market, whereas the equity market does not 
influence government yields. This is somewhat surprising, as one might expect that the equity 
market is the more dominant financial market due to its higher liquidity.  
Table 4: National Cross-Asset VAR Subsample 02-07 















Equity (-1) 1.000* 0.998* 0.998* 0.999* 0.999* 0.998* 0.999* 
Sovereign Debt (-1) -0.002* -0.002* -0.001* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 












 Sov. Debt 
Austria 
Sov. Debt 
Equity (-1) 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.002 
Sovereign Debt (-1) 0.996* 0.996* 0.997* 0.997* 0.996* 0.997* 0.997* 
 
Turning to the second subsample, comprising the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the 
subsequent outbreak of the global financial crisis, there are some interesting changes to 
observe. Contrary to the first subsample, Table 5 displays some heterogeneity among the 
seven countries. Furthermore, the two lag model specification implies that determinants have 
a longer lasting effect in some markets. Starting with the autoregressive coefficients, it can be 
seen that while the second lag in all national equity markets is still insignificant, the second 
autoregressive lag in the sovereign debt market is significant. Looking more closely at the 
magnitude of the sovereign debt autoregressive coefficients, these market seems to be 
trending. Whereas the first lag is positive and above one, the second lag is negative, which 
indicates that an increasing (decreasing) yield today will tend to further rise (fall) on the 
subsequently day.3 
A second interesting finding is that the stock market takes on a more dominant role. 
While the national equity market starts to influence the sovereign debt market in most 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




countries, the influence of sovereign debt on equity markets turns mostly insignificant. The 
more dominant role of stock markets is not surprising, considering that the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers and the subsequent financial crisis mainly caused equity markets to crash 
and only subsequently spilled over to European sovereign debt markets around 2011. This 
reasoning implies that, due to the extremely negative performance of equity markets between 
2008 and 2011, the stock index starts to influence the domestic sovereign yield.  
Looking at the general performance of sovereign debt markets during this period 
shows the divergence of yield spreads. Italy and Spain are the only countries exhibiting 
increasing yields on government bonds (see Table 15 in the Appendix). In all other countries 
the yield on public debt continues to decrease as in the first subsample. The rising yield in 
Italy and Spain represents an important development due to two reasons: First, European 
sovereign debt markets have not experienced any considerable yield increases for a long 
period. Second, this yield increase in southern Europe happened despite the fact that the ECB 
started lowering its key interest rate as of 2008 and launched their first asset purchase 
program in 2010. This confirms the hypothesis that in the Italian and Spanish sovereign debt 
market the increased awareness of country-specific risk by investors dominated the effects of 
monetary policy. Moreover, the fact that sovereign yields in all other countries further 
decreased, even though economic and financial fundamentals in these countries did not 
significantly change, shows that ECB’s monetary policy has partially led to a decoupling of 
sovereign bond prices and their fundamentals.  
The last and most recent subsample (see Table 6), from 2012 until 2016, captures the 
deepening of the European sovereign debt crisis, as well as the further easing of ECB’s 
monetary stance. The national sovereign debt market completely loses its influence on the 
domestic equity market. In Italy and Spain, the equity market has no influence on the 
sovereign debt market, while in the second subsample this patter was inherent in Germany 
and Italy. The general picture illustrated by the three subsamples shows that the heterogeneity 
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among countries increases, indicating that the process of European integration has slowed 
down or even reverted.  To investigate this issue further, it is of interest to analyse how cross-
border linkages between the countries have changed over time.  
Table 5: National Cross-Asset VAR Subsample 08-11 















Equity (-1) 0.981* 0.934* 1.006* 1.009* 0.960* 1.034* 1.020* 
Equity (-2) 0.010 0.056 -0.014 -0.021 0.033 -0.038 -0.025 
Sovereign Debt (-1) 0.011 0.027* 0.000 -0.015 0.015 0.010 0.054* 
Sovereign Debt (-2) -0.012 -0.028* -0.001 0.013 -0.016 -0.013 -0.054* 















Equity (-1) -0.199 -0.338* -0.197 -0.233* -0.397* -0.300* -0.387* 
Equity (-2) 0.194 0.340* 0.188 0.232* 0.396* 0.308* 0.390* 
Sovereign Debt (-1) 1.099* 1.070* 1.125* 1.188* 1.114* 1.233* 1.156* 
Sovereign Debt (-2) -0.102* -0.078* -0.127* -0.197* -0.117* -0.247* -0.162* 
 
 
Table 6: National Cross-Asset VAR Subsample 12-16 
!
!















Equity (-1) 1.000* 0.962* 0.888* 1.012* 1.007* 0.980* 1.052* 
Equity (-2) -0.008 0.027 0.105* -0.019 -0.014 0.008 -0.067* 
Sovereign Debt (-1) -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 0.005 0.014 
Sovereign Debt (-2) 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.005 -0.007 -0.014 
        










 Sov. Debt 
Austria 
Sov. Debt 
Equity (-1) -0.337* -0.346* -0.318 -0.306 -0.360* -0.382* -0.193* 
Equity (-2) 0.324* 0.344* 0.309 0.295 0.349* 0.350* 0.216* 
Sovereign Debt (-1) 0.997* 1.097* 0.998* 1.073* 1.059* 1.139* 1.105* 




7.2! Cross-Border Linkages 
7.2.1! Equity Market 
Table 7 displays the VAR models of the three subsamples, each model consisting of the seven 
national equity markets.  Looking at the first subsample, 2002-2007, there are not many 
significant coefficients besides the autoregressive lags, hence there are not many 
interdependences among European equity markets. The Belgian stock index positively 
influences Italian stocks, while Dutch equity negatively effects the stock market in Austria. 
These interdependencies are rather surprising since there is no obvious economic explanation 
for these findings. The VAR model of the crisis subsample, 2007-2011, leaves more room for 
interpretation. While the negative influence of the Netherlands towards Austria continues, the 
effect of Belgian stocks on Italian equity vanishes. Moreover, the Spanish equity market 
becomes the most influential market, positively affecting French, Italian and Dutch stocks. 
Pressure on Spanish equity leads to decreasing stock indices in France, Italy and the 
Netherlands, while positive developments in the Spanish market increase stock prices in these 
three specific countries. One might suspect this influence due to the negative development of 
the Spanish equity market. However, between 2007 and 2011, the Spanish equity index did 
not suffer the biggest losses. Table 15, found in the Appendix, shows that the equity index in 
Spain fell by only 45.0%, whereas the drops in Italy (59.0%), Belgium (51.6%) and Austria 
(67.8%) were larger. The reason for the dominant role of the Spanish equity market can be 
probably more attributed to its high volatility. Table 16 in the Appendix displays the 
annualized standard deviation of the financial markets. Behind Austria (38.83%) the Spanish 
equity market is the most volatile one (32.37%), illustrating the nervousness of the market, 
which subsequently seems to spillover to other equity markets.  
Another interesting result is that the three smallest economies develop considerable 
interdependencies between 2007 and 2011. Innovation in the Netherlands negatively affects 
Belgium and Austria, while the Belgian equity market positively affects the Austrian stock 
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index. Again looking at the general performance of the equity indices might provide an 
explanation. While Austrian stocks suffer the biggest losses (67.8%) followed by Belgium 
(51.6%), the Dutch stock market experiences the smallest loss (33.09%) among all countries. 
Thus it seems that the strongest divergence among national equity markets between 2007 and 
2011 is happening between the smallest stock markets.  
 
Looking at the most recent subsample, 2012-2016, most of the previously observed patterns 
in the VAR models disappear. The interdependencies between Austria, Netherlands and 
Belgium vanish, as well as the dominant role of the Spanish stock index. Surprisingly, 
Spanish equity becomes the most sensitive market besides the German one towards other 
national equity markets. However, the main finding is again embodied by the presence of 
negative coefficients. While there was no negative coefficient in the first subsample and only 
two between 2008 and 2011, in the third subsample there are three, illustrating the increasing 
number of negative linkages. It also seems that the negative interdependencies observed 
among small countries between 2007 and 2011 shift to the larger economies. Pressure on both 
Italian and Spanish stocks tend to have a positive effect on the German equity market. 
Moreover, Italian equity also exhibits negative interdependencies with Dutch stocks. The 
negative linkages between Netherlands, Belgium and Austria in the second subsample as well 
as the those observed between Italy, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands in the third 
subsample, might be a sign for “flight to safety”, where investors move their capital from 
investments perceived as riskier (Italy, Spain, Belgium, Austria) to presumably safer ones 
(Germany, Netherlands). However, this “flight to safety” phenomenon usually concerns 
spillovers following extreme co-movements and not structural linkages between markets, like 
in the VAR considered in this section. For a more in-debt analysis the issue of possible 
extreme co-movements between markets will be examined in section 7.3. 
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The divergence of European equity markets is also confirmed by looking at the 
correlation matrix found in Table 17 in the Appendix. Correlations between 2008 and 2011 
have significantly decreased relative to the period 2002 to 2007. This development is even 
more impressive since in a financial crises volatility and correlations tend to grow (Sandoval 
and Franca, 2012; Frank, 2009). In the last subsample the correlations tend to increase again, 
while still not reaching those levels observed in the the first subsample. This finding together 
with the considerabe number of negative interdependencies found in the VAR models, 
challenges the perception of increasingly integrated European financial markets. Additionally, 
in the last subsample, the effects of ECB’s asset purchases have to be considered. Even 
though these programs do not effect stock markets directly, there is general consensus that 
these programs indirectly lift equity prices. Following this reasoning one would expect 
increasing correlations between equity markets. Thus, correlations between 2012 and 2016 
may would have fallen even stronger relative to those observed in the first subsample without 
































Table 7: Cross-Country Equity VAR 















 Subsample: 2002-2007 
Germany Equity(-1) 0.980* 0.012 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.008 -0.005 
France Equity(-1) 0.024 0.966* 0.004 -0.017 0.000 0.010 0.023 
Italy Equity(-1) -0.025 -0.005 0.963* -0.007 -0.011 0.003 0.009 
Spain Equity(-1) 0.016 0.000 0.005 0.996* -0.003 -0.009 0.011 
NL Equity(-1) -0.005 0.002 -0.008 0.005 0.987* -0.012 -0.027* 
Belgium Equity(-1) 0.004 0.007 0.019* 0.003 0.004 0.989* 0.007 
Austria Equity(-1) 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.987* 
        
 Subsample: 2008-2011 
Germany Equity(-1) 0.990* 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.033 0.026 0.034 
France Equity(-1) -0.032 0.906* -0.064 -0.080 -0.045 -0.060 0.018 
Italy Equity(-1) -0.013 -0.005 0.983* -0.001 -0.012 -0.006 -0.002 
Spain Equity(-1) 0.013 0.030* 0.034* 1.015* 0.029* 0.025 0.025 
NL Equity(-1) 0.005 -0.001 -0.022 -0.009 0.971* -0.004* -0.081* 
Belgium Equity(-1) 0.014 0.014 0.020 0.019 0.020 1.004* 0.057* 
Austria Equity(-1) 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.007 -0.003 0.957* 
  
 Subsample: 2012-2016 
Germany Equity(-1) 0.976* 0.005 0.010 0.008 0.003 0.006 0.003 
France Equity(-1) 0.008 0.991* 0.044 0.071* 0.018 0.005 0.057 
Italy Equity(-1) -0.024* -0.018 0.960* -0.025 -0.022* -0.014 -0.021 
Spain Equity(-1) -0.024* 0.012 0.012 0.992* 0.014 0.009 -0.001 
NL Equity(-1) 0.010 0.010 0.006 -0.008 0.982* 0.009 -0.001 
Belgium Equity(-1) -0.003 -0.006 -0.026 -0.025 0.004 0.986* -0.025 
Austria Equity(-1) -0.004 -0.008 -0.019 -0.022 -0.010 -0.014 0.973* 
!
!
7.2.2! Sovereign Debt Market 
The general picture of sovereign debt linkages shows similarities with those linkages seen in 
the equity market. While the crisis subsample has many significant interdependencies, in the 
first and third subsample the autoregressive coefficients dominate. When looking at the 
linkages between 2002 and 2007 the role of the German sovereign debt market deserves 
special attention. With the exception of Austria, all other sovereign yields are negatively 
influenced by German public debt. Consequently, a decrease (increase) in the 10-year German 
government yield tends to increase (decrease) yields in other countries. Taking into account 
*!p<0.05!
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the general convergence of interest rates among all seven countries in the first subsample this 
is somewhat surprising. The negative interdependencies confirm the hegemonic status of 
Germany and might indicate that, already prior to the global financial crisis and the sovereign 
debt crisis, Germany has been perceived as a safe haven. 
Between 2008 and 2011 the number of significant linkages among sovereign debt 
markets increases. Besides the negative interdependencies of Germany, which were already 
existent in the first subsample, the Netherlands and partially France also exhibit negative 
linkages with Italy and Spain. This development confirms the revival of country-specific risk 
factors, causing a differentiation between countries. On the one hand, there are the relatively 
robust “core” countries in the Euro area like Germany, the Netherlands and partially France. 
One the other hand, there are the “peripheral” countries, namely Italy and Spain, which 
exhibit weaker economic fundamentals. This segregation is also confirmed by the general 
performance of sovereign yield in the second subsample, displayed in Figure 14 found in the 
Appendix. As already mentioned in section 7.1, only sovereign yields in Italy and Spain have 
increased between 2008 and 2011. 
In the third subsample almost all interdependencies vanish. More importantly, all 
negative interdependencies disappear. It seems that country-specifics risk factors lose their 
importance and thus also the differentiation between safer and riskier countries. The obvious 
disappearance of country-specific risk in pricing sovereign bonds can be attributed to ECB’s 
strong market intervention through their asset purchases, causing yields to fall across all 
countries. This development is questionable since the fundamentals like GDP-to-Debt ratio 
and GDP growth in most countries have not significantly improved. Sovereign bond yields 
not only decreased between 2012 and 2016, but yields on government bonds are lower than 
ever before. 
 Looking at the sovereign debt correlation matrices in Figure 17, a pattern similar to 
those in equity markets can be observed: very high correlations in the first subsample 
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considerably decrease in the crisis period, while they are moderately recovering between 2012 
and 2016. Important to mention are the extremely high correlations among sovereign debt 
markets until the financial crisis. Between 2002 and 2007 all correlations are above 0.99. 
Interestingly, in the second subsample correlations do not only tend to decrease but there are 
also some negative correlations appearing between individual countries. These negative 
correlations can be observed between presumably safer countries (Germany, Netherlands and 
Austria) and riskier ones (Italy and Spain) 
Table 8: Cross-Country Sovereign Debt VAR 















 Subsample: 2002-2007 
Germany Sov(-1) 0.888* -0.083* -0.083* -0.096* -0.091* -0.105* -0.076 
France Sov(-1) 0.060 1.009* 0.038 0.053 0.062 0.050 0.024 
Italy Sov(-1) 0.019 0.020 1.012* 0.020 0.025 0.015 0.020 
Spain Sov(-1) -0.001 0.014 0.013 0.987* -0.001 0.033 0.019 
Netherland Sov(-1) 0.032 0.036 0.016 0.035 0.972* 0.049 0.046 
Belgium  Sov(-1) -0.007 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.021 0.950* 0.003 
Austria Sov(-1) 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.958* 
        
 Subsample: 2008-2011 
Germany Sov(-1) 0.923* -0.024 -0.056* -0.141* -0.042 -0.148* -0.083* 
France Sov(-1) 0.102* 1.011* 0.070 -0.198* 0.061* 0.190* 0.090* 
Italy Sov(-1) -0.048* -0.001 0.984* 0.042* -0.033* -0.018 -0.017 
Spain Sov(-1) 0.006 -0.001 0.004 1.019* 0.002 0.031* 0.004 
Netherland Sov(-1) -0.012 0.025 0.039 0.069 0.981* -0.109* 0.067* 
Belgium  Sov(-1) 0.031 -0.003 0.003 -0.038 0.025 0.920* -0.004 
Austria Sov(-1) -0.010 -0.015 -0.055 -0.080* -0.004 -0.085* 0.935* 
  
 Subsample: 2012-2016 
Germany Sov(-1) 0.979* 0.008 -0.035 -0.037 0.013 -0.019 0.002 
France Sov(-1) -0.005 0.954* 0.019 0.026 -0.012 0.004 -0.015 
Italy Sov(-1) 0.010 -0.001 0.953* -0.001 0.004 0.007 0.012 
Spain Sov(-1) -0.003 0.004 0.028* 0.996* 0.000 0.000 -0.005 
Netherland Sov(-1) 0.021 0.016 0.038 0.003 0.990* 0.030 0.024 
Belgium  Sov(-1) -0.006 0.006 0.009 -0.018 0.003 0.970* 0.010 
Austria Sov(-1) -0.004 0.012 -0.008 0.030 -0.003 0.005 0.968* 
!*!p<0.05!
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7.3! Extreme Co-Movements 
As mentioned above, to further investigate the “flight to safety” phenomenon it is crucial to 
examine possible extreme market co-movements following unexpected negative shocks in 
one country. Accordingly, the shock dummy variables are introduced to the cross-asset VAR 
model (1). When running the VAR models for a specific country the shock dummy of its own 
market is not included. Additionally, to limit the number of displayed coefficients the 
autoregressive lags of the two financial markets are not included in the output tables. Thus 
Table 9, 10 and 11 display only the coefficients of equity shock dummies, while Table 12, 13 
and 14 show only the coefficients of the sovereign debt shock dummies.  
7.3.1! Equity Shocks 
Looking at Table 9 displaying the first subsample, it can be seen that shocks in most equity 
markets negatively affect almost all other national stock indices. This illustrates the high 
degree of integration among national European stock markets. Surprisingly, the relatively 
small equity markets in Belgium and Austria exhibit some robustness against shocks in 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. One would expect that especially these small 
countries are highly influenced by cross-border developments. However, this is not the case 
between 2002 and 2007. The effects of equity shocks on sovereign yields displays a more 
distinct picture. Equity shocks in Germany, Spain and Austria tend to coexist with decreasing 
yields in most other countries. This confirms the possible “flight to safety” from stocks to the 
relatively safer bonds. Interestingly, this phenomenon seems to be triggered by equity shocks 
in presumably safer countries like Germany and Austria. The effects of shocks in Spanish 
equity are more in line with what can be expected. Equity shocks in this particular country 





















German Eq. Shock - -0.007* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.003 -0.002 
France Eq. Shock -0.011* - -0.007* -0.008* -0.012* -0.011* -0.006* 
Italy Eq. Shock -0.010* -0.009* - -0.010* -0.008* -0.007* -0.002 
Spain Eq. Shock -0.008* -0.007* -0.008* - -0.008* -0.002 -0.005* 
NL Eq. Shock -0.006* -0.011* -0.005* -0.009* - -0.013* 0.003 
Belgium Eq. Shock -0.008* -0.010* -0.006* -0.002 -0.011* - -0.007* 
Austria Eq. Shock -0.005* -0.005* -0.004* -0.006* -0.003* -0.007* - 
        













German Eq. Shock - -0.014* -0.013* -0.015* -0.015* -0.016* -0.019* 
France Eq. Shock -0.007 - 0.000 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 
Italy Eq. Shock -0.006 -0.005 - -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 0.001 
Spain Eq. Shock -0.015* -0.014* -0.012 - -0.015* -0.011 -0.015* 
NL Eq. Shock -0.012 -0.010 -0.014 -0.014 - -0.013 -0.007 
Belgium Eq. Shock -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.010 - -0.013 
Austria Eq. Shock -0.013* -0.013* -0.012* -0.014* -0.012* -0.011* - 
!
Moving on to the equity markets in subsample two illustrated in Table 10, there are two 
interesting developments: First, the Belgium stock index is not susceptible to external equity 
stocks. Second, shocks in the Spanish equity market do not coexist with pressure on stock 
prices in other countries. Both these developments are rather surprising since both national 
equity indices show a similarly strong negative development between 2008 and 2012. 
Looking at the effect of equity shocks on government yields, shows that shocks in Germany 
equity continue to decrease sovereign yields in most other countries, while the similar effect 
of Spanish and Austrian equity shocks observed in the first subsample vanishes and seems to 
shift to Italy. Furthermore, two positive coefficients exist between Italy and Spain. These co-
movements show that shocks in Italian and Spanish stocks lift the yield in the other 
“peripheral” country. This confirms that negative developments in one of these two countries, 
simultaneously increase the perceived risk in the other country. Consequently, investors seem 
to not distinguish between these two countries to a specific extent. 
*!p<0.05!
! 30!

















German Eq. Shock - - -0.017* -0.011* -0.010* -0.007 -0.015* 
France Eq. Shock -0.014* - -0.003 -0.009 -0.009* -0.006 -0.002 
Italy Eq. Shock -0.015* -0.015* - -0.021* -0.013* -0.001 -0.017* 
Spain Eq. Shock -0.005 -0.002 -0.018* - -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 
NL Eq. Shock -0.011* -0.014* -0.013* -0.009* - -0.018* -0.013* 
Belgium Eq. Shock -0.006* -0.010* -0.002 -0.011* -0.014* - -0.019* 
Austria Eq. Shock -0.012* -0.009* -0.010* -0.007* -0.011* -0.014* - 
        













German Eq. Shock - -0.036* -0.040 -0.075* -0.036* -0.027 -0.034* 
France Eq. Shock -0.026 - -0.023 -0.047* -0.009 -0.023 -0.023 
Italy Eq. Shock -0.063* -0.018 - 0.119* -0.040* 0.037* -0.014 
Spain Eq. Shock -0.001 -0.016 0.093*  0.005 -0.008 0.009 
NL Eq. Shock 0.007 0.011 -0.008 -0.013 - -0.009 0.009 
Belgium Eq. Shock -0.023* -0.020 -0.035* 0.001 -0.014 - -0.010 
Austria Eq. Shock -0.003 0.009 -0.012 -0.015 0.012 0.002 - 
!
Table 11 indicates that the effects of equity shocks on other national stock indices between 
2012 and 2016 have only marginally changed. Some coefficients change their significance, 
though no clear pattern can be observed. Turning to sovereign debt markets, the effect of 
German equity shocks disappears. Rather the German and Dutch sovereign yields are affected 
by equity shocks in Italy and Spain. Pressure on stock markets in these two countries lead to 
decreasing yields in Germany and the Netherlands. Moreover, negative developments in 
Italian or Spanish stocks also leads to pressure in the respective sovereign bond market of the 
other “peripheral” country. These findings represent another confirmation of the segregation 
between riskier (Italy, Spain) and less risky countries (Germany, Netherlands). An exception 
to this differentiation is represented by the reaction of the Austrian sovereign debt market to 
equity shocks. As a presumably less risky country it exhibits similarities to Italy and Spain: 
shocks in the national equity market decrease yields in Germany and the Netherlands, while 
increasing yields in Italy and Spain. 
*!p<0.05!
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German Eq. Shock - -0.008* -0.004 -0.004 -0.008* -0.009* -0.007* 
France Eq. Shock -0.009* - -0.009* -0.006 -0.007* -0.003 -0.004 
Italy Eq. Shock -0.005* -0.007* - -0.016* -0.004* -0.003 -0.010* 
Spain Eq. Shock -0.003 -0.005* -0.018* - -0.003 -0.003 -0.008* 
NL Eq. Shock -0.008* -0.008* -0.005 -0.002 - -0.009* -0.003 
Belgium Eq. Shock -0.008* -0.007* -0.004 -0.008* -0.009* - -0.008* 
Austria Eq. Shock -0.007* -0.008* -0.012* -0.010* -0.006* -0.007* - 
        













German Eq. Shock - 0.000 0.019 0.017 0.010 0.005 0.009 
France Eq. Shock 0.026 - 0.017 0.018 -0.027 -0.029* -0.017 
Italy Eq. Shock -0.013* 0.000 - 0.069* -0.002* 0.014 -0.002 
Spain Eq. Shock -0.029* -0.005 0.086* - -0.018* 0.010 0.002 
NL Eq. Shock 0.008 -0.011 -0.018 -0.015 - 0.008 -0.008 
Belgium Eq. Shock 0.012 0.004 -0.001 0.011 0.013 - 0.003 
Austria Eq. Shock -0.013* 0.002 0.034* 0.038* -0.013* 0.006 - 
!
7.3.2! Sovereign Debt Shocks 
Table 12, 13 and 14 display possible extreme co-movements among financial markets 
following a negative shock to the 10-year sovereign bond yield in one of the considered 
countries. As already mentioned, a negative shock to a sovereign debt market is identified by 
5% of the most positive residuals in the domestic cross-asset VAR model (1). Positive 
residuals in the sovereign debt market imply that the observed government yield on a specific 
trading day is considerably higher than what would be predicted by the model. A higher yield 
corresponds with a lower bond price and thus shows that investors perceive the bond as 
relatively riskier. 
Looking at the effects of sovereign debt shocks on equity markets in the pre-crisis 
subsample in Table 12, shows a limited number of significant co-movements. Negative 
developments in German and French sovereign bond markets have a positive effect on stocks 
in the Netherlands and Belgium. Additionally, unexpected movements in French and Dutch 
*!p<0.05!
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yields tend to increase the Germany equity index.  As this subsample does not include any 
considerable tensions in sovereign debt markets, rising sovereign yields might indicate a 
greater willingness of investors to increase risk in their portfolio. Accordingly, investments in 
government bonds are reallocated into specific equity markets. Moreover, the Italian and 
Spanish equity market seem to be isolated, not affected by any cross-country yield shocks. 
The effect of sovereign debt shocks to other European sovereign bond markets again confirms 
the dominant role of German government debt as a benchmark for European sovereign debt 
markets. Unexpected negative developments in the German market tend to also induce 
pressure on sovereign debt in other European countries. Besides the strong influence of 
German public debt, in general European sovereign debt markets are highly integrated, 
evidenced by many significant extreme co-movements among the considered countries and 
the high correlation in this period mentioned above. 

















German Sov. Shock - 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.008* 0.008* 0.007* 
France Sov. Shock 0.010* - 0.006 0.004 0.010* 0.008* 0.002 
Italy Sov. Shock -0.001 -0.002 - -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 
Spain Sov. Shock -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 - -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 
NL Sov. Shock 0.008* 0.008* 0.003 0.005 - 0.004 0.000 
BEL Sov. Shock 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.003 - 0.005 
Austria Sov. Shock 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 - 
        













German Sov. Shock - 0.019* 0.021* 0.024* 0.032* 0.023* 0.023* 
France Sov. Shock 0.008 - 0.013 0.012 0.025* 0.021* 0.022* 
Italy Sov. Shock 0.020* 0.020* - 0.019* 0.013 0.020* 0.014 
Spain Sov. Shock 0.018* 0.011 0.019* - 0.005 0.013 0.006 
NL Sov. Shock 0.029* 0.022* 0.022* 0.016* - 0.013 0.014 
BEL Sov. Shock 0.015 0.020* 0.013 0.019* 0.013 - 0.018 
Austria Sov. Shock 0.015 0.014 0.016* 0.013 0.013 0.015 - 
!*!p<0.05!
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The extreme co-movements in the second subsample exhibit two patterns, both indicating 
again a segregation between countries (see Table 13). While shocks to sovereign debt markets 
in presumably safer countries (Germany, Netherlands) positively influence cross-border 
equity markets, the countries that were more affected by the crisis (Italy, Spain) negatively 
influence European stock indices.  This pattern seems to indicate that the market perceives 
shocks to yields in these two country groups differently. Unexpected yield increases in 
Germany and the Netherlands coexist with positive market sentiments, whereas shocks in 
Italy and Spain cause market pressure in European equity markets. As German and Dutch 
government bonds are perceived as one of safest financial assets in Europe, a decreasing 
demand for them indicates less uncertainty in the markets and thus an increasing appetite for 
risk by investors. By contrast, increasing yields in Italy and Spain are caused by concerns 
about the fiscal state of these two countries and their economy. These events increase 
uncertainty in European financial markets and thus induce pressure on cross-border equity 
prices.  
The effect of sovereign debt shocks on other European public debt markets shows 
three interesting developments relative to the first subsample. First, there are considerably 
more extreme interdependencies among the markets. This is mainly driven by French yield 
shocks becoming more important in influencing other markets, and increasing positive co-
movements among the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria. Second, the cross-border effects of 
yield shocks are stronger, evidenced by higher absolute coefficients. These effects are even 
stronger in relative terms, as the general yield level among the countries has further decreased 
between 2008 and 2011. Third, negative coefficients appear in the subsample. They imply 
that decreasing yields in some countries coexist with unexpected yield increases in other 
countries. These negative co-movements are observed between Germany and the Netherlands 
on one side and Italy and Spain on the other, again showing this particular grouping of 
countries.   
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German Sov. Shock - 0.015* 0.019* 0.020* 0.016* 0.015* 0.012* 
France Sov. Shock 0.003 - 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
Italy Sov. Shock -0.015* -0.013* - -0.014* -0.011* -0.006 -0.012* 
Spain Sov. Shock -0.003* -0.001 -0.011* - - -0.002 -0.007 
NL Sov. Shock 0.017* 0.008 0.008 0.007 -0.002 0.006 0.016* 
BEL Sov. Shock -0.002 -0.003 -0.008* -0.004 -0.002 - 0.000 
Austria Sov. Shock 0.004 0.007* 0.006 0.004 0.009* 0.004 - 
        













German Sov. Shock - 0.047* -0.014* -0.004* 0.069* 0.018 0.032* 
France Sov. Shock 0.040* - 0.041* 0.038* 0.027* 0.046* 0.058* 
Italy Sov. Shock -0.028* -0.009 - 0.102* -0.019* 0.055* -0.002 
Spain Sov. Shock -0.015 0.008 0.101* - -0.007 0.032* -0.010 
NL Sov. Shock 0.082* 0.000 -0.081* -0.041* - -0.017 0.025* 
BEL Sov. Shock 0.001 0.041* 0.102* 0.077* 0.015 - 0.032* 
Austria Sov. Shock 0.027* 0.068* 0.028* 0.001 0.049* 0.054* - 
!
!
The effect of sovereign shocks on stock markets in the last subsample, illustrated by Table 14, 
shows the same pattern as between 2007 and 2011: German shocks coexist with positive 
sentiments in other European equity markets, while unexpected negative developments in the 
Italian and Spanish sovereign debt market lead to pressure on European equity indices. The 
negative effect of shocks in Italy and Spain is even more pronounced than in the first 
subsample, now leading to pressure in all other considered equity markets. The significant 
decrease of sovereign yields in Italy (-6.37%) and Spain (-5.23%) between 2012 and 2016, 
which is mainly due to ECB’s unconventional monetary policy, might provide an explanation. 
As the sovereign debt shock dummies mostly coexist with increasing yields in the respective 
market, the increased markets risk has to outweigh the positive effects of the monetary policy 
in order to increase yields on that trading day.  
*!p<0.05!
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The reaction of sovereign debt markets to yield shocks in other countries does not 
reveal any major changes relative to the second subsample. Some coefficients change their 
significance but without showing any clear pattern.   

















German Sov. Shock - 0.007* 0.012* 0.012* 0.004* 0.004* 0.007* 
France Sov. Shock 0.006* - 0.004 0.006* 0.004* 0.003 0.005 
Italy Sov. Shock -0.010* -0.012* - -0.021* -0.010* -0.008* -0.013* 
Spain Sov. Shock -0.007* -0.008* -0.020* - -0.006* -0.007* -0.010* 
NL Sov. Shock 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.001 - -0.001 0.004 
BEL Sov. Shock -0.004 -0.003 -0.010* -0.007* -0.003 - -0.003 
Austria Sov. Shock 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.001 - 
        













German Sov. Shock - 0.033* -0.051* -0.044* 0.063* 0.007 0.031* 
France Sov. Shock 0.032* - 0.024 -0.021 0.036* 0.041* 0.030* 
Italy Sov. Shock -0.012* 0.032* - 0.183* 0.000 0.033* 0.017* 
Spain Sov. Shock -0.030* -0.010 0.145* - -0.016* 0.008 -0.003 
NL Sov. Shock 0.072* 0.017* 0.007 0.032* - 0.019* 0.016* 
BEL Sov. Shock -0.002 0.035* 0.058* 0.049* 0.013 - 0.043* 













Table 15: Overview of main Findings 
!




-!All countries exhibit similar linkages between 
their national equity and debt market, showing a 
high degree of homogeneity across all countries 
-!The sovereign debt market influences the domestic 
equity market - an increasing yield tends to  
decrease the domestic equity index 
-! Signs of increasing heterogeneity among countries, shown by 
differences in model coefficients 
-!Equity becomes the dominant market influencing the domestic 
sovereign yield, whereas public debt loses its influence on the 
domestic stock index 
-!The national sovereign debt market 
completely loses its influence on the 







-!Only a few significant cross-country 
interdependencies  
-! Spanish equity becomes the most influential stock market  
-! Smallest economies (NL, BEL, AUS) develop considerable 
interdependencies among each other 
-!Number of negative 
interdependencies among national 
equity markets increases, indicating 
“flight to safety” phenomenon. Safe 
countries (GER, NL) vs. risky 
countries (IT, ESP and partially BEL) 
Sovereign 
Market 
-!GER sovereign debt negatively influences all other 
yields, indicating the hegemonic status of GER 
public debt 
-!Negative linkages indicate further differentiation of countries: "core” 
countries (GER, NL, FR) vs. “peripheral” countries (IT, ESP) 
-!Negative interdependencies between 
countries disappear, indicating that 










-! Shocks in most markets negatively affect almost 
all other national stock indices 
-! Small equity markets in BEL and AUS exhibit 
some robustness against shocks in GER, IT, ESP 
and NL 
-! Shocks in GER, ESP and AUS tend to coexist with 
decreasing yields in most other countries 
-!BEL stock index is not susceptible to any external stocks 
-! Shocks in ESP do not coexist with pressure on stock prices in other 
countries 
-! Shocks in IT and ESP lift the sovereign yield in the other 
“peripheral” country 
-!Effect of GER shocks on other 
courtiers disappears - rather GER and 
NL yields are affected by equity 





-! Shocks in GER, FR and NL positively affect stock 
indices in other countries  
-! IT and ESP equity market seem to be isolated, not 
being affected by any cross-country yield shocks 
-! Shocks in GER tend to induce pressure on 
sovereign debt markets in all other countries 
-! Sovereign debt markets are highly integrated, 
evidenced by many significant extreme co-
movements among the sample countries  
-!GER shocks coexist with positive sentiments in other equity markets 
-!Unexpected negative developments in IT and ESP lead to pressure 
on most other equity indices 
-! Increasing number of extreme interdependencies among markets  
-!Cross-border effects of shocks become stronger, evidenced by higher 
absolute coefficients 
-!Negative interdependencies appear, implying that yields in some 
countries (IT, ESP) decrease as a consequence of unexpected yield 
increases in other countries (GER, NL) 
-!Effect of shocks on equity show 
similar pattern as in 1st subsample!
-!Effect of shocks on sovereign debt 
markets are similar to the 2nd 
subsample!
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8! Limitations and further Research 
A limitation of the underlying paper is the possible noisiness included in the VAR model. 
Even though the division into three subsamples limits the number of observations included in 
the individual models, VAR models estimation based on more than 1000 daily observations 
partially suffers from noise. In order to avoid this problem one could consider weekly or 
monthly observations, though this would lead to considerable information loss in the data 
sample. Moreover, dummies could be constructed based on more than one cut-off criterion. 
This would allow to compare spillover effects of stocks with different intensity. Additionally, 
the cut-off selection for the residual shock dummies could be based on a formal test, rather 
than on subjective comparison. 
As in most academic research the paper can act as a basis for further academic 
analysis. The selection of countries could be extended to include the economies most affected 
by the financial crisis, namely Ireland and Greece. Furthermore, corporate debt as a third asset 
class could also be included, as this market has gained importance in Europe because of two 
reasons: First, ECB’s most recent asset purchase program is focusing on private debt markets 
in order to inject liquidity into the European financial system. Second, the Euro area is 
converging towards a capital-market-oriented financial system, in which corporations 
increasingly rely on direct financing through equity and bond markets, while bank debt is 
becoming relatively less important.4  These two developments would make the inclusion of 
corporate debt as a third financial market interesting to analyse.   
9! Conclusion 
This paper studies financial market linkages in Europe throughout the lifetime of the Euro. In 
considering the national equity and sovereign debt markets of the seven biggest economies in 
Europe, I find important developments since the introduction of the Euro in cross-country as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4!See among others Murinde, Agung and Mullineux (2004)!
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well as cross-asset linkages. There are two structural breaks identified in the domestic cross-
asset linkages in the sample countries: The first break occurs around 2008 as a consequence 
of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent outbreak of the global financial crisis. 
The second break is identified around 2012 and coexists with the start of the European 
sovereign debt crisis and ECB’s extremely loose monetary policy.  
For the cross-country linkages between financial markets there is evidence for a 
revival of country-specific risk. As a result, increasing heterogeneity between European 
countries can be observed between 2008 and 2012. In combination with a growing number of 
negative interdependencies among European financial markets, it shows that the integration of 
these markets has stopped or even partially reverted itself. There are still considerable 
structural differences between Euro area countries, more than previously anticipated. After a 
period of convergence investors have started to differentiate between Euro countries. 
Especially, in sovereign debt markets investors realized that country-specific risk is still 
significantly present, causing a differentiation between riskier “peripheral” Euro area 
countries, namely Italy and Spain, and presumably safer “core” countries, like Germany, the 
Netherlands and partially France. Thus, a “flight to safety” phenomenon can be observed, 
where in periods of financial uncertainty market participants reallocate their capital to safe 
havens. Interestingly, there is evidence that these “flight to safety” capital flows partially 
revert themselves in periods of relative stability in European financial markets. Unexpected 
yield increases in extremely safe German and Dutch sovereign bonds coexist with positive 
sentiments in European equity markets, demonstrating an increasing appetite for risk by 
investors.  
In recent years decreasing sovereign yields in combination with rising equity prices 
indicate a partial decoupling of asset prices from economic and financial fundamentals. This 
development can be mainly attributed to ECB’s market intervention, revoking the previous 
emergence of country-specific risk factors. This poses a threat to the European financial 
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system due to three reasons. First, the risk in sovereign debt is not properly priced, leading to 
artificially low costs of excessive sovereign indebtedness. Second, ECB’s bond purchases 
indirectly affect stock prices, thus increases the danger of possible bubbles in European equity 
markets. Third, the low yield environment puts pressure on insurances, pension funds and 
other institutional investors, who struggle to achieve a promised return without taking 
excessive risks. However, the trade-off between the effectiveness of this unconventional 
policy in stabilising price levels and the potential dangers it posts to the financial system 
strongly diverge. 
The cross-asset as well as cross-country linkages and especially their structural 
changes described in this paper, illustrate the complexity of European financial markets. 
These interdependencies call for a more holistic approach to financial supervision.  
Accordingly, the European Commission pursued a number of initiatives in order to create a 
safer and sounder financial system, the most prominent one being the creation of the 
European Banking Union. The question remains if these measures put in place as a response 





Table 16: Performance of the Financial Market 
 Equity Market 
 Germany France Italy Spain Netherland Belgium Austria 
2002-2007 39.74% 20.61% 24.69% 74.16% 9.53% 25.07% 206.70% 
2008-2011 -37.98% -39.74% -59.02% -45.02% -33.09% -51.58% -67.75% 
2012-2016 41.09% 35.82% 3.13% 0.87% 60.62% 111.98% -1.97% 
        
 Sovereign Debt Market (change of yield) 
 Germany France Italy Spain Netherland Belgium Austria 
2002-2007 -0.69% -0.64% -0.62% -0.74% -0.70% -0.77% -0.73% 
2008-2011 -2.47% -1.34% 2.37% 0.74% -2.22% -0.43% -1.56% 




Table 17: Annualized Standard Deviation of the Financial Market 
 Equity Market 
 Germany France Italy Spain Netherland Belgium Austria 
2002-2007 24.98% 21.87% 17.21% 20.30% 23.19% 20.14% 14.87% 
2008-2011 29.03% 29.67% 31.75% 32.37% 27.92% 29.20% 38.83% 
2012-2016 18.33% 18.39% 24.26% 22.93% 16.69% 17.50% 21.62% 
        
 Sovereign Debt Market  
 Germany France Italy Spain Netherland Belgium Austria 
2002-2007 0.60% 0.61% 0.60% 0.60% 0.61% 0.61% 0.65% 
2008-2011 0.90% 0.85% 1.23% 1.23% 0.82% 0.98% 0.85% 












Table 18: Equity Correlation Matrix 
 Subsample: 2002-2007 
 Germany France Italy Spain Netherland Belgium Austria 
Germany 1.000 - - - - - - 
France 0.987 1.000 - - - - - 
Italy 0.945 0.977 1.000 - - - - 
Spain 0.941 0.957 0.972 1.000 - - - 
Netherland 0.956 0.943 0.865 0.839 1.000 - - 
Belgium 0.944 0.977 0.991 0.958 0.873 1.000 - 
Austria 0.835 0.881 0.943 0.951 0.693 0.935 1.000 
        
 Subsample: 2008-2011 
 Germany France Italy Spain Netherland Belgium Austria 
Germany 1.000 - - - - - - 
France 0.960 1.000 - - - - - 
Italy 0.771 0.889 1.000 - - - - 
Spain 0.747 0.885 0.930 1.000 - - - 
Netherland 0.962 0.957 0.767 0.789 1.000 - - 
Belgium 0.916 0.933 0.846 0.821 0.935 1.000 - 
Austria 0.874 0.929 0.937 0.868 0.847 0.933 1.000 
  
 Subsample: 2012-2016 
 Germany France Italy Spain Netherland Belgium Austria 
Germany 1.000 - - - - - - 
France 0.988 1.000 - - - - - 
Italy 0.903 0.905 1.000 - - - - 
Spain 0.907 0.901 0.960 1.000 - - - 
Netherland 0.962 0.975 0.832 0.834 1.000 - - 
Belgium 0.924 0.939 0.768 0.764 0.982 1.000 - 















Table 19: Sovereign Debt Correlation Matrix 
 Subsample: 2002-2007 
 Germany France Italy Spain Netherland Belgium Austria 
Germany 1.000 - - - - - - 
France 0.999 1.000 - - - - - 
Italy 0.993 0.994 1.000 - - - - 
Spain 0.997 0.998 0.993 1.000 - - - 
Netherland 0.997 0.998 0.993 0.998 1.000 - - 
Belgium 0.996 0.998 0.992 0.998 0.998 1.000 - 
Austria 0.991 0.991 0.984 0.992 0.992 0.992 1.000 
        
 Subsample: 2008-2011 
 Germany France Italy Spain Netherland Belgium Austria 
Germany 1.000 - - - - - - 
France 0.936 1.000 - - - - - 
Italy -0.224 0.086 1.000 - - - - 
Spain -0.280 -0.086 0.787 1.000 - - - 
Netherland 0.972 0.949 -0.170 -0.290 1.000 - - 
Belgium 0.512 0.742 0.674 0.509 0.565 1.000 - 
Austria 0.908 0.959 -0.007 -0.200 0.967 0.667 1.000 
  
 Subsample: 2012-2016 
 Germany France Italy Spain Netherland Belgium Austria 
Germany 1.000 - - - - - - 
France 0.964 1.000 - - - - - 
Italy 0.852 0.932 1.000 - - - - 
Spain 0.798 0.879 0.977 1.000 - - - 
Netherland 0.991 0.978 0.880 0.828 1.000 - - 
Belgium 0.929 0.988 0.952 0.894 0.951 1.000 - 



















Figure IV: Identified Sovereign Debt Shocks based on 5% Positive Residuals 
!
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